The past few months have produced some rather notable monetary activity. For myriad reasons, the money pumping of the not-so-USFed during the period of 2009-2019 produced nominally higher price inflation, but not anywhere near the increases in prices that should have occurred. Our operating theory as the 2008 crisis was ending was that the newly unveiled ‘quantitative easing’ nay relentless money printing, would push up both consumer prices and the nominal prices of various asset classes as well. In essence, the ‘fed’ would replace the burst US residential housing market bubble with yet another bubble.

The central bank of the US, followed by other G7 central banks, embarked not just on money printing, but money channeling as well. The blowout preventers, if you will, for this excess were primarily the US Bond Market and the US stock market as well. Bond yields were artificially low during much of this period, thanks to the fed monetizing USGovt debt. Nominal yields were a joke. Real yields were far into the red. The US consumetariat didn’t notice this because, as always, credit was easily obtained. The consumer just dove deeper and deeper in debt. This was not a US-centric phenomenon. The European Union behaved in much the same manner, but the EU blew up a massive residential housing bubble as well, particularly England. Technically, England is no longer in the EU, but for practical purposes, this distinction is negligible.

What many people (investors in particular) forget is that there are always cycles. These cycles can rather easily be altered by extraneous actions of central banks, governments, and even consumers. However, the more distorted or prolonged the boom is, the bust is all the more pronounced. Think of Newton’s Laws and apply them to monetary policy and economics.

With the proverbial spring fully compressed by the massive deficit spending commencing in 2020, the not-so-USFed poured literally trillions in fresh dollars into the USEconomy, monetizing massive amounts of government debt to finance social spending. Since the US consumer, as a whole, has negligible savings, when economies were shutdown, the government became the primary support structure at levels never before seen. The ‘channeling’ of the 2009-19 period went out the window and the fresh dollars were poured directly into the consumer economy. We all know what happened next. Prices head for the stratosphere.

We noticed something curious start at the end of Q1 2023, however. The US M2 monetary aggregate began to contract – for the first time in.. well, forever basically. Was this a one-off month or the beginning of a new trend. We’ve seen a few months’ worth of data now and it would appear that there is something of a trend brewing. Deflation. Not falling prices, but an actual contraction of the money supply. It is interesting to note that during this stretch, US stock indexes, particularly the DJIA have forged towards all-time highs. What gives? Housing prices have taken a hit, which, in ordinary circumstances, would be a good thing – from an affordability perspective at least, but the reason housing prices are cooling is simply because the cost of mortgages has been pushed out of the reach of many by mortgage rates that are still hovering around 7%.

Our thesis – for now at least – is that the not-so-USFed is once again channeling money, but not in the same way it was during the 2009-19 period. It appears – and we admit it is very early to say for sure – that the consumer economy has, in the aggregate, been cut off from new money. The financial economy has not. However, the net effect is the contraction of the US M2 aggregate.

Interestingly enough, the last data pointed to a reversal, which complicates the situation a bit. The reversal could end up being a one-off event, or it could be a true reversal in the trend. Further study on prior deflationary periods is in order. In any case, the top to bottom action in the aggregate as shown above does explain the slowing of the rate of price inflation. Remember, inflation is a monetary event that manifests itself in prices. While the mainstream financial press claims otherwise in their headlines, the whole of their reporting proves they know the truth and choose to obfuscate, which is typical.

Since monetary data has a significant lag associated with it, we will not be able to ascertain until likely the end of 2023 or Q1 2024 if this is definitely the case or not. There should be anecdotal indications between now and then and we will certainly keep the readers of this blog appropriately informed.

Sutton/Mehl